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Abstract—Pricing schemes are an important smart grid feature
to affect typical energy usage behavior of energy users (EUs).
However, most existing schemes use the assumption that a buyer
pays the same price per unit of energy to all suppliers at any
particular time when energy is bought. By contrast, here a
discriminate pricing technique using game theory is studied. A
cake cutting game is investigated, in which participating EUs in a
smart community decide on the price per unit of energy to charge
a shared facility controller (SFC) in order to sell surplus energy.
The focus is to study fairness criteria to maximize sum benefits to
EUs and ensure an envy-free energy trading market. A benefit
function is designed that leverages generation of discriminate
pricing by each EU, according to the amount of surplus energy
that an EU trades with the SFC and the EU’s sensitivity to price.
It is shown that the game possesses a socially optimal, and hence
also Pareto optimal, solution. Further, an algorithm that can be
implemented by each EU in a distributed manner to reach the
optimal solution is proposed. Numerical case studies are given
that demonstrate beneficial properties of the scheme.
Index Terms—Smart grid, cake cutting game, shared facility,
discriminate pricing, social optimality, Pareto optimality.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the main stimuli behind adopting energy man-agement in smart grid is the use of different pricing
schemes, in which an energy entity changes the price of per
unit electricity according to the generation and demand so
as to motivate users to modify their attitudes towards elec-
tricity consumption and supply [1]–[3]. Particularly, with the
advancement of distributed energy resources (DERs), different
pricing techniques can assist the grid or other energy entities,
such as shared facility controllers (SFCs)1 to operate reliably
and efficiently by obtaining some energy supply from the
energy users (EUs) [4].
Over the past few years there has been significant interest
in devising pricing schemes for energy management in smart
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1An SFC, as we will see in the next section, is an entity that is responsible
for managing energy of different shared facilities of a smart community.
grid. These schemes can be classified into three general
categories: time-of-use pricing; day-ahead pricing; and real-
time pricing [5]. Time-of-use pricing has three different pricing
rates: peak, off-peak and shoulder rates based on the time of
electricity use by the EUs [6]. Day-ahead pricing is determined
by matching offers from generators to bids from EUs in order
to develop a classic supply and demand equilibrium price at
an hourly interval [7]. Finally, real-time pricing [5] refers to
tariffed retail charges for delivering electric power and energy
that vary over hour-to-hour, and are determined through an
approved methodology from wholesale market prices. Other
pricing schemes that have been discussed in the literature
include critical peak pricing, extreme day pricing, and extreme
day peak pricing [5]. Discussion of various pricing schemes for
energy management in smart grid can be found in [8]–[15] and
the references therein. Nevertheless, an important similarity in
most of these pricing schemes is that all of the EUs decide on
the same selling price per unit of energy at a particular time.
With the increase in government subsidies for encouraging
the use of renewables, more EUs with DERs are expected to
be available in the future [16]–[20]. This will subsequently
lead to a better completion of purchasing targets for SFCs
in order to maintain electricity for shared facilities in a
community [21]. This is due to the fact that the opportunity
of an SFC to trade electricity with EUs can greatly reduce its
dependency on the grid, and consequently decrease the cost
of energy purchase. However, not all EUs would be interested
in trading their surplus energy if the benefit from the SFC
is not attractive [4]. In particular, as we will see shortly, this
can happen to EUs with limited energy surplus and/or with
higher sensitivity to price whose respective return could be
very small. Nevertheless, as shown in [4], one possible way to
address this problem is that these EUs can sell their energy at
a relatively higher price per unit of energy, within a reasonable
margin, compared to EUs with very large DERs (and/or, with
lower sensitivity to the choice of price) without affecting their
revenue significantly.
It is natural to think that the benefit to the end-user will
increase if the price for selling each unit of energy increases.
However, we note that in an energy market with a large number
of sellers the buyer has many choices to buy the electricity.
Hence, a significantly higher price per unit of energy from a
seller can motivate the buyer to switch its buying from that
expensive option to a seller who is selling at a comparatively
cheaper rate [22]. Thus, even with a higher selling price
per unit of energy, the net benefit to a user may decrease
significantly if the amount of energy that it can sell to the
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buyers, i.e., the SFC in this case, becomes very small. This
type of phenomenon has occurred recently in the global oil
market [23]. This can further be illustrated by a toy example
as follows.
Consider the numerical example given in Table I where
EU1 and EU2 sell their surplus energy to the SFC to meet
the SFC’s 40 kWh energy requirement. It is considered that
EU1 and EU2 have DERs with capacity of 50 kWh and 10
kWh respectively (and EU1 is significantly larger than EU2
in terms of available energy to supply). In case 1, EU1 and
EU2 sell 35 and 5 kWh of energy to the SFC at a price of
20 cents/kWh. Hence, the revenues of EU1 and EU2 are 700
and 100 cents respectively and the total cost to the SFC is 800
cents. In case 2, EU1 and EU2 choose their prices differently
and sell their surplus energy at rates of 18 cents/kWh and
22 cents/kWh respectively. Now, due to the change of price in
case 2, if EU1 reduces its selling amount to 32 (since the price
is reduced) and EU2 increases its surplus amount to 8 kWh
(as the current price is high) the resulting revenue changes to
576 and 176 cents respectively for EU1 and EU2 whereas the
total cost to the SFC reduces to 752 cents. Thus, according
to this example, it can be argued that discriminate pricing
is considerably beneficial to EUs with small energy (revenue
increment is 76%) at the expense of relatively lower revenue
degradation (e.g., 17% in case of EU1) from EUs with larger
energy capacity. It further reduces the cost to the SFC by 6%.
However, one main challenge for such price discrimination
among different EUs, which is not discussed in [4] and yet
needs to be explored, is the maintenance of fairness of price
distribution between different EUs to enable such schemes to
be sustained in electricity trading markets. For example, if the
EUs are not happy with the price per unit of energy that they
use to sell their surplus energy, or if they envy each other
for the adopted discrimination, energy markets that practice
such discriminate pricing schemes would eventually diminish.
Hence, there is a need for solutions that can maintain the price
disparity between EUs in a fair manner, whereby considering
their available surplus energy and their sensitivity to change
of price, an envy-free energy trading environment with a view
to obtain a socially optimal2 energy management solution is
ensured.
To this end, this paper complements the existing pricing
schemes in the literature by studying the fairness of selecting
different prices for different EUs in smart grid. However,
unlike [4], where a two-stage Stackelberg game is studied, we
take a different approach in this paper. Particularly, we explore
a cake-cutting game (CCG) for selecting discriminate prices
for different users. In the proposed CCG, the EUs with smaller
available energy can decide on a higher unit price, and the
price is also adaptive to the sensitivity of EUs to the choice
of price. A suitable benefit function is chosen for each of the
EUs that enables the generation of discriminate pricing so as
to achieve a socially optimal solution of the game. Thus, also,
Pareto optimality is directly implied by this socially optimal
solution, and hence an envy-free energy trading market is
2A socially optimal solution maximizes the sum of benefits to all EUs in
the smart grid network [24].
TABLE I: Numerical example of a discriminate pricing scheme where an SFC
requires 40 kWh of energy from two EUs and the SFC’s total price per unit
of energy to pay to the EUs is 40 cents/kWh.
Case 1 Case 2
Payment to EU1 (cents/kWh) 20 18
Payment to EU2 (cents/kWh) 20 22
Energy supplied by EU1 (kWh) 35 32
Energy supplied by EU2 (kWh) 5 8
Revenue of EU 1 (cents) 700 576 (-17%)
Revenue of EU 2 (cents) 100 176 (+76%)
Cost to the SFC (cents) 800 752 (-6%)
established. We propose an algorithm that can be adopted by
each EU in a distributed manner to decide on the price vector
by communicating with the SFC, and the convergence of the
algorithm to the optimal solution is demonstrated. Finally, we
present some numerical case studies to show the beneficial
properties of the proposed discriminate pricing scheme.
We stress that the current grid system does not allow such
discriminate pricing among EUs. Nonetheless, the idea of price
discrimination is not new and has been extensively used in
economic theory. For instance, the effect of price discrim-
ination on social welfare is first investigated in 1933 [25],
which is further extended with new results in [26] and [27].
In recent years, the authors in [28] study the airport congestion
pricing technique when the airline carriers discriminate with
respect to price. In [29], the authors use a new panel of data
on buyer-supplier transfers and build a structural model to
empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in
a medical device market. The study of intertemporal price
discrimination between consumers who can store goods for
future consumption needs is presented in [30], and the effects
of third-degree price discrimination on aggregate consumers
surplus is considered in [31]. Further, a framework for flexible
use of cloud resources through profit maximization and price
discrimination is studied in [32]. In this context, we also
envision discriminate pricing as a further addition to real-
time pricing schemes in future smart grid. Such a scheme
is particularly suitable for the energy trading market when
the SFC may want to reduce its dependence on a single
dominant user. For example, in the toy example the SFC may
rely heavily on User 1 who has a large surplus for the same
price model. However, by giving more incentive to User 2, the
SFC managed to reduce its dependence on User 1 by buying
less energy from it. Please note that this could happen in a
real-world scenario in which a buyer pays a small supplier
a relatively higher price in order to help the small supplier
grow, and at the same time to reduce the dependence on a
single big supplier. Such trading will prevent the possibility
of the big supplier growing too big and creating a monopoly,
which could lead to a serious problem in the long run. Please
note that examples of such differentiation can also be found
in current standard Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) schemes [33].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model is described in Section II and the problem
of price discrimination is studied as a CCG in Section III.
We provide numerical case studies to show the beneficial
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Fig. 1: Demonstration of the elements of the considered system model and
the direction of the flow of power and information within the system.
properties of the proposed scheme in Section IV. Finally, we
draw some concluding remarks in Section V.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a smart grid system consisting of N EUs, where
N = |N |, an SFC and a main grid. Each EU n ∈ N can be
considered as a single user or a group of users connected
via an aggregator that acts as a single entity. Each EU is
equipped with DERs such as solar panels and wind turbines
and does not have any storage facility3. Hence, EU n needs
to sell its surplus energy, if there is any, either to the SFC
or to the main grid after meeting its essential demand in
order to make some extra revenue. Due to the fact that the
buying price pg,buy of a main grid is considerably lower than
pricing within a facility [35], it is reasonable to assume that
the EUs would be more keen to sell their surplus to the SFC
instead of to the grid4. Alternatively, if the payment from
the SFC is not sufficiently attractive to any EU, the EU may
schedule its equipment for extra consumption or may choose
to sell to the grid instead of selling to the SFC. The SFC,
on the other hand, controls the electricity consumption of
equipment and machines that are shared and used by the EUs
on a regular basis, and does not have any energy generation
capacity. Therefore, the SFC relies on EUs and the grid for its
required electricity. Essentially, the SFC is interested in buying
as much energy as possible from the EUs as the buying price
per unit of energy from the main grid is significantly higher.
All the EUs, the main grid and the SFC are connected to
each other through power and communication lines [1]. A
schematic representation of the considered system model is
shown in Fig. 1.
To this end, let us assume that at a particular time during a
day each EU n ∈ N has an energy surplus of en that it wants
to sell either to the SFC or to the grid with a view to make
3An example of such a system is a grid-tie solar system without storage
device [34].
4For example, in the state of Queensland in Australia, the selling price
of electricity is 16.262 cents/kWh during off peak hours (which is almost
double during peak hours) [36], whereas the buying price of electricity is
6.348 cents/kWh under Queensland’s Feed-in Tariff scheme [37].
extra revenue. Each EU n charges the SFC a price pn per unit
of energy for selling its en. pn, ∀n do not need to be equal
to each other and can be varied according to the amount of
surplus at each EU and the EU’s sensitivity αn > 0 to the
choice of price. The SFC, on the other hand, wants to buy
this energy en from each EU n in order to meet the demands
of the shared facilities of the community. We assume that the
SFC has a budget constraint C, and hence, the sum of what
the SFC needs to pay to all EUs needs to satisfy,∑
n
enpn ≤ C. (1)
Please note that such a budget is necessary to prevent the
EUs from increasing their selling price per unit of energy
considerably and thus maintaining market competitiveness,
which may arise due to allowing EUs to decide on the selling
price through interacting with the SFC5. This budget also
enables us to decouple the SFC’s decision making process
of buying energy from the EUs (which is the main focus
of this work) from the problem of the SFC’s buying energy
from the grid. However, the budget, which facilitates price
discrimination in the proposed scheme, needs to be chosen
such that it is always lower than the total price that the SFC
needs to spend buying the same amount of energy from the
grid and thus always benefits the SFC in terms of reducing
cost. This is due to the fact that if the total money that the
SFC pays to the EUs becomes equal to (or greater than) the
amount that it needs to pay the grid, the SFC will not be
encouraged to buy energy from the EUs as the SFC can buy all
its required energy from the grid independently. Nevertheless,
a suitable value for a budget C may depends on many other
factors, e.g., how willing is a user to sell its surplus to the SFC,
which requires human behavioral models to obtain reasonable
estimates. For example, as a rational entity, each EU n would
be interested in charging the SFC as much price per unit of
energy as possible for selling its surplus. However, on the one
hand, a very high price may discourage the SFC from trading
any energy with the EU and rather motivate the SFC to buy
its energy from the grid. On the other hand, if the selling price
of an EU is too small, this may compel the EU to withdraw
its surplus from the energy market as the expected revenue
from energy trading with the SFC would be significantly lower.
Nonetheless, in this paper we consider a general setting, i.e.,
a budget C for the SFC when it buys energy from the EUs.
Now, the choice of price pn by an EU n is also restricted by
its sensitivity to the choice of price. For example, as discussed
in Table I, a smaller price may not affect an EU with a very
large surplus (i.e., lower sensitivity), but it can significantly
alter the total revenue of an EU with lower available energy
(higher sensitivity). In this context, it is considered that the
price pn per unit of energy that an EU n asks from the SFC
depends not only on the available energy en to the EU but
also on the the EU’s sensitivity αn to the choice of price,
which is chosen motivated by the use of preference/reluctance
parameters in [21], [22], and [38]–[40]. αn captures the
5As we will see later, EUs and the SFC interact with each other in the
proposed scheme to decide on the price vector.
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sensitivity of each EU’s benefit from changing the per unit
price and thus is used to quantify the different types of players.
For example, if one user has a large amount of surplus, he may
want to sell the energy at a relatively cheaper price compared
to a player who has a small surplus to sell. This is due to the
fact that players with larger amount of surplus energy might be
more interested in selling all the energy for a higher gain and
thus will be flexible in reducing their price for selling more
energy. Hence, a relatively lower price may not affect their
revenues significantly [15]. On the other hand, a user with
a small energy surplus will not be more keen to sell energy
unless the price per unit of energy is considerably higher as
otherwise the expected return will be very small. Hence, the
evaluation of a change in price per unit of energy as well as the
willingness to increase the price may not be same to both the
players. We capture this aspect through a parameter αn, which
is multiplied by the price per unit of energy (i.e., to capture
the fact that a similar price may be interpreted differently by
different EUs).
Also, as a rational entity each EU n wants to increase the
price pn per unit of energy that it charges the SFC as much
as possible. However, the maximum price Pn chosen by each
n needs to be such that it does not exceed the grid’s selling
price pg per unit of energy. For example, if Pn is greater than
grid’s selling price pg , clearly the SFC will not buy any energy
from the EU. To this end, each EU n may want to increase
pn to a maximum value of Pn per unit of energy for selling
its surplus and the choice of price pn is determined by 1) the
surplus en available to EU n, 2) EU’s sensitivity αn to the
choice of price pn, and 3) finally, the budget available to the
SFC such that (1) is satisfied.
Now, to determine the energy trading parameter p =
[p1, p2, . . . , pn, . . . , pN ], each EU n interacts with the SFC to
decide on the price pn per unit of energy that it wants to charge
the SFC for selling its energy en with a view to maximizing
its benefit. To capture the benefit to each EU n, we propose
a benefit function6 Xn. In standard game theoretic research,
e.g., [41], the benefit function is an input to the game, whose
outcome needs to be a real number, and illustrates the change
in benefits corresponding to the change of a player’s choice of
action or environmental parameters. Note that benefit functions
can be a combination of parameters with different dimensions
and units to capture the effects of the change of parameters by
the players. For instance, in [42], the authors consider a utility
function, which is a combination of transmission rate and the
cost of transmission in order to show how different choices
of price and transmission rate can affect the benefits to the
respective player. In [40], the authors use a welfare function
for their game, in which the welfare function is a combination
of total cost of energy trading and the square of the amount of
energy traded by the player. Further, a non-cooperative game
is proposed in [43], in which a utility function is combining
the cost of energy and the quantity of energy to be sold.
Now, we propose a benefit function Xn, which is based on
a linearly decreasing marginal benefit,
X˜n = Pn − αnpn − en, (2)
6Also known as utility function and welfare function.
contingent on the following assumptions:
1) Each EU n is a rational entity and wants to choose a
price pn per unit of energy as close to the maximum
possible price Pn, e.g., equal to the grid’s selling price,
as possible.
2) EU n is sensitive to its choice of price per unit of energy
through the parameter αn, and thus the choice of pn is
restricted by the choice of αn.
3) An EU with large surplus of energy has relatively lower
marginal benefit compared to the EUs with lower surplus
for the same choice of price [4].
Note that a utility function with decreasing marginal benefit
is shown in [44] to be appropriate for energy users. Then, the
same property is also used to design utility functions in [15],
[22], [39], and [40], where the players participate in games
for making decisions on energy trading parameters including
price and energy. To this end, the chosen utility function in (3)
also possesses the property of declining marginal benefit and
is close to the utility functions used in [15], [22], and [40].
Please note that the authors modeled a two-level game in [40]
and Stackelberg games in [15] and [22] for designing energy
management for smart grid. Therefore, a similar property is
used to model the utility function of the proposed game.
To that end, the net benefit Xn that an EU n can attain from
selling its surplus en to the SFC at a price pn can be defined
as
Xn(pn) =
∫ pn
0
X˜ndqn
= Pnpn −
αn
2
pn
2 − enpn. (3)
The benefit function in (3) is a quadratic function of pn,
which leverages the generation of discriminate pricing [4]
between different EUs of the system. As can be seen in (3), the
proposed benefit function possesses the following properties:
1) The benefit function is a concave function of pn, i.e.,
δ2Xn
δpn
2 < 0. Hence, the benefit of an EU may decrease
for an excessively high pn. This models the fact that
the if the price is very high, the SFC may restrain from
buying energy from the EU, which will eventually reduce
its expected benefit from energy trading.
2) The benefit function Xn is an increasing function of Pn
and a decreasing function of αn. That is δXnδPn > 0 and
δXn
δαn
< 0. Therefore, a EU with higher sensitivity will be
prone not to change its selling price pn significantly.
A graphical representation of the properties of the benefit
function Xn is shown in Fig. 2.
It is important to note that for sustainable energy trading in
a smart grid system the overall system benefits from trading
needs to be profitable. Otherwise, EUs with significantly lower
revenue from energy trading would not participate in such
trading [15], which will eventually diminish the energy trading
market. In this context, the objective of each EU n in the
system is to interact with the SFC in order to determine a price
pn per unit of energy, within the budget C in (1) of the SFC,
so as to sell its energy surplus en such that the sum
∑
nXn
over all EUs in the system is maximized. Mathematically, the
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Fig. 2: Demonstration of the effects of different parameters on the net benefit
achieved by an EU by trading its energy with the SFC. As can be seen from
the figure, a higher sensitivity αn leads the EU n to achieve its maximum
net benefit at a lower pn. Also, as the surplus of an EU decreases, it achieves
its maximum net benefit at a relatively higher price compare to other EUs.
objective can be expressed as
max
pn
X(p) = max
pn
[∑
n
(
Pnpn −
αn
2
pn
2 − enpn
)]
, (4)
such that
∑
n enpn ≤ C. Now, to explore how each EU n in
the proposed system can identify a price pn within the budget
C in (1) such that their objective in (4) can be attained, we
propose a CCG in the next section.
We stress that the proposed problem can also be solved
by using other techniques such as dual decomposition or
other centralized schemes. In order to solve the problem in
a distributed fashion and thus allow the EUs to maintain their
privacy (i.e., not to disclose private information like αn and
Pn to the SFC and other EUs in the network), we choose to
use a CCG over other centralized techniques. As discussed in
[45], sharing such private information not only allows the SFC
to control the EUs’ energy usage behavior, but also enables the
SFC to access the EUs’ private lifestyles, which is a significant
privacy concern at present. Hence, certain information, such
as αn (the sensitivity of a user to the change of price), needs
to be kept private and should not be shared with the SFC. In
addition, although the SFC may solve the proposed problem in
a centralized manner if it has access to the private information,
the EUs may be concerned that the SFC could modify αn, and
thus distribute the total budget in favor of the EUs that have
good relationships with the SFC, which is especially possible
if the EUs and the SFC do not trust each other. Therefore,
considering the above-mentioned factors, we choose to use a
distributed technique such as the proposed CCG that leads to
a solution with desirable properties like social optimality and
being envy-free, while at the same time preserving the privacy
of the EUs.
III. CAKE CUTTING GAME
A. Brief Background
CCG is a branch of game theory that deals with the division
of some finite pool of resources in a way that meets certain
valuation criteria or objectives of the players splitting the
resource [46]. Formally, the cake can be represented as a
convex set, which is the total budget C ⊂ R of the SFC in
this proposed case. Each player n will receive an allocation
pnen of this C by choosing a suitable pn with the property
pnen ⊆ C. Now, before proceeding to the design of the
proposed game, first we discuss some key properties of a
CCG [46], which are relevant to the proposed scheme as
follows.
1) The allocation vector p∗ = [p∗1, p∗2, . . . , p∗N ], which con-
tains the outcome received by each player n ∈ N via
distributing the cake C is complete if∑
n
enp
∗
n = C. (5)
2) An allocation is called a socially optimal allocation if the
allocation has the property
X(p∗) ≥ X(p), (6)
where p = [p∗1, p∗2, . . . , pn, . . . , p∗N ] for any n ∈ N .
3) An allocation p∗ possesses the property of Pareto opti-
mality if no player with an allocation p∗n1 can be better off
with a share pn1 without hurting at least one other player.
Mathematically, an allocation with p∗n1 and p∗n2 is Pareto
optimal, if there exists no other allocation containing pn1
and pn2 such that
Xn1(p
∗
n1) ≤ Xn1(pn1) ∧Xn2(p
∗
n2) ≤ Xn2(pn2),
∀n1 = 1, 2, . . . , N, ∃ n2 = 1, 2, . . . , N ; p∗n1, p
∗
n2 ∈ p
∗. (7)
4) If a complete allocation p∗ of a CCG is socially optimal,
it is also Pareto optimal [46].
B. Proposed Game
To decide on the energy trading parameter pn, each EU in
the smart community interacts with the SFC, and we propose
a CCG Π to capture this interaction. In the proposed CCG
Π, each EU n decides on its selling price pn through the
considered game and offers the price to the SFC. The SFC,
on the other hand, compares the received price vector p from
all the EUs and decides whether the total expense is within
its budget C, i.e., if the expense satisfies (1), and thus decides
the solution of the game. Formally. the proposed CCG Π can
be defined by its strategic form as7.
Π = {N , {Pn}n∈N , X}, (8)
where N is the set of players, i.e., EUs, in the game and
Pn is the set of strategies of EU n, i.e., pn ∈ Pn, ∀n,
7Since the EUs do not have storage facilities, all EUs with energy surplus
will be interested in participating in the game to make revenue as long as
the offered price is more than the grid’s buying price. Hence, the proposed
CCG falls within the example of game theoretic problems where competitive
buyers participate in the game to increase their utilities, e.g., studies in [22]
and [39], [40].
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that satisfy (1). In (8), the choice of each EU pn ∈ Pn
affects the choice of other EUs in choosing their suitable
selling price due to the presence of (1). Hence, the proposed
CCG Π can be considered as a variational inequality problem
Γ [47], in which the choice of strategies of multiple players
are coupled through (1). Hence, variational equilibrium, which
is the solution concept of variational inequality problems, can
be presumed as the solution of the proposed CCG Π. For the
rest of the paper, we will use the term cake cutting solution
(CCS) to refer to a variational equilibrium of the proposed
CCG Π.
Definition 1. Consider the CCG Π in (8), in which X is
defined by (4). A set of strategies p∗ constitutes the CCS of
the proposed Π if and only if the strategy set satisfies the
following inequalities:
X(p∗n,p
∗
−n) ≥ X(pn,p
∗
−n),
∀n ∈ N , pn ∈ Pn ∀n,
∑
n
enpn ≤ C, (9)
where p−n = [p1, pn, . . . , pn−1, pn+1, . . . , pN ].
C. Properties of CCS
In this section, we investigate the properties of the CCS.
In particular, we determine whether there exists a socially
optimal CCS of the proposed CCG Π. Essentially, a socially
optimal solution maximizes the total benefit to all the EUs in
the smart grid, and thus is suitable for allocation of C in order
to maximize the overall system benefit.
Theorem 1. There exists a socially optimal CCS of the
proposed CCG Π between the EUs in the smart grid.
Proof: First we note that the proposed CCG Π is a
variational inequality problem Γ as we have mentioned earlier.
Therefore, the CCG Π can be defined as Γ(P,Z), which
can be used to determine a vector p ∈ P ∈ Rn such that
〈Z(p∗),p− p∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P [48]. Here,
Z = − (∇pnXn(pn))n∈N , (10)
and P is the vector of all strategies of all EUs in the network.
The solution of the Γ(P,Z) is the CCS. Now, the pseudo-
gradient of the benefit function (4) is [48]
Z =


α1p1 + e1 − P1
α2p2 + e2 − P2
.
.
.
αNpN + eN − PN

 , (11)
whose Jacobean is
JZ =


α1 0 · · · 0
0 α2 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
0 0 · · · αN

 . (12)
In (12), αn for n = 1, 2, . . . , N is always positive. Now, by
considering the nth leading principal minor JZn of the leading
principal sub-matrix8 JZ, it can be shown that JZn is always
positive, i.e., |JZ1| > 0, |JZ2| > 0 and so on. Therefore,
JZ is positive definite on P, and thus Z is strictly monotone.
Hence, Γ(P,Z) possesses a unique CCS [47]. Furthermore,
due to the presence of the joint constraint (1), the CCS is also
the unique global maximizer of (4) [47], which subsequently
proves that the CCS is the socially optimal solution of the
proposed CCG Π.
Whereas the CCG Π is shown to have a socially optimal
solution, in order to divide the budget C among the EUs in an
efficient manner it is also necessary that the budget should be
Pareto optimal. We note that in a Pareto efficient allocation no
EU can change its strategy without hurting at least one another
EU in the network. Therefore, if the allocation is both socially
and Pareto optimal, the allocation of price per unit of energy
between different EUs will be fair and envy-free. To this end,
first we note that the social optimality of the CCS has already
been shown in Theorem 1. Therefore, according to Property 4
in Section III-A, demonstrating the existence of a complete
allocation of price between the EUs will subsequently establish
the Pareto optimality of the CCS.
Now, due to the coupled constraint (1), the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) condition, using the method of Lagrange mul-
tipliers [49], for the EU n’s choice on pn in (4) can be defined
as [47]
Pn − αnpn − en − τn = 0, τn ≥ 0, (13)
and
τn
(∑
n
enpn − C
)
= 0, ∀n. (14)
Here, τn is the Lagrange multiplier for EU n. It is important to
note that if any strictly monotone variational inequality prob-
lem constitutes a CCS such as the proposed case (according
to Theorem 1), the multiplier τn, ∀n possesses the property
τn > 0, ∀n [47]. As a consequence, it is clear from Theorem 1
and (14) that for the proposed CCG Π the total allocation of
budget between the EUs is equal to C, i.e.,
∑
n pnen = C.
Thus, the allocation is complete, and consequently the CCS of
the proposed CCG Π is Pareto optimal.
Remark 1. Since, the solution of the CCG Π possesses
a solution, which is both socially and Pareto optimal, the
allocation of price per unit of energy between different EUs
will be fair and envy-free9.
Another important characteristic of the decision making
process of a EU n concerning its choice of a price pn per
unit of energy can be explained from (13). Since, τn > 0 ∀n,
pn <
Pn − en
αn
. (15)
Thus, an EU with higher energy surplus and/or higher sen-
8The ith order principal sub-matrix Ai can be obtained by deleting the last
g − i rows and last g − i columns from a g × g matrix A.
9Such an envy-free property allows each EU to trade its surplus energy
with the SFC without envying other EUs in the network for the payments they
receive, and thus ensures market transparency despite price discrimination and
consequently enables such an energy trading market to be sustained.
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sitivity to the choice of price needs to choose a relatively
smaller price per unit of energy compared to EUs with lower
surplus and/or lower sensitivity in order to reach the socially
and Pareto optimal CCS if the proposed CCG Π is adopted.
D. Algorithm
Now, to design an algorithm for the EUs to reach the
desired solution of the CCG Π, we first note that the proposed
game is a strictly monotone variational inequality problem.
Therefore, the CCS can be attained by solving the game
through an algorithm, which is suitable for solving a monotone
variational inequality problem. To this end, we propose to use
the S-S method [50], which is shown to be effective to solve
monotone variational inequality problems in [15], to solve the
proposed CCG Π. Essentially, the S-S method used in this
paper is a hyperplane projection method that requires two-way
communications between EUs and the SFC in the network to
reach the CCS. A geometrical interpretation is used where two
projections per iteration are required. For instance, let pt be the
current approximation of the solution of Γ(P,Z). Then, first
the projection r(pt) = Proj
P
[pt −Z(pt)] is computed10 and a
point zt is searched for in the line segment between pt and
r(pt) such that the hyperplane ∂H , {p ∈ R|〈Z(kt), p−zt〉 =
0} strictly separates pt from the solution p∗ of the problem.
Then, once ∂H is constructed, pt+1 is computed in iteration
t+ 1 by projecting onto the intersection of the feasible set P
with hyperspace Ht , {p ∈ R|〈Z(kt), p − zt〉 ≤ 0}, which
contains the solution set.
The proposed algorithm is initiated with the announcement
of a total budget by the SFC to buy electricity from the con-
nected EUs. The SFC can set the budget using any statistical
technique such as a Markov chain model based on historical
budget data sets [51]. Upon receiving the information about the
budget and determining its own requirement, each EU decides
the amount of energy that it wants to sell and submits it to
the SFC. Once, the budget is set and the surplus of each EU
is determined, all the EUs participate in the proposed CCG Π
through Algorithm 1 and reach the optimal price vector, i.e.,
the CCS p∗, for selling their surplus energy to the SFC. The
details of the algorithm in shown in 1.
Proposition 1. The algorithm proposed in Algorithm 1 is
always guaranteed to reach the CCS of the proposed CCG
Π.
Proof: To prove Proposition 1, first we note that the S-S
method is based on a hyperplane projection technique [48],
which is always guaranteed to converge to a non-empty
solution if the variational inequality problem is strictly mono-
tone [47]. It is proven in Theorem 1 that the proposed CCG Π
is strictly monotone over the choice of pn ∀n. Therefore, the
proposed Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to always reach a non-
empty CCS, and thus Proposition 1 is proved.
Note: Please note that the proposed game is a static game
and therefore does not consider the effect of the change of
parameters across different time slots. Here, we consider a
single time instant and keep the entire focus of the study
10Projection Proj
P
[k] = argmin{||w − k||, w ∈ P}, ∀k ∈ Rn [15].
on investigating how the considered energy trading scheme
can be conducted in an envy-free environment so as to
achieve a socially optimal solution by using the proposed price
discrimination technique. Once such price discrimination is
established, extending the proposed work to a time-varying
environment is an interesting topic for future work. Note that
the electricity price in real-time pricing schemes is decided
differently at different times of the day based on the conditions
of several parameters such as the demand, electricity genera-
tion, and the reserve of energy in the system. Therefore, the
proposed scheme has the potential to be incorporated into such
a real-time pricing scheme, in which the energy controller may
decide to adopt the price discrimination at a particular time of
the day, whenever it seems beneficial.
IV. CASE STUDY
To show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we
consider an example in which a number of EUs with energy
surplus are participating in supplying energy to the SFC in
a time of interest. The energy surplus of each EU to supply
to the SFC is assumed to be a uniformly distributed random
variable in the range [3.6, 12.25] kWh [15]. The target per unit
price Pn for all n ∈ N is assumed to be 45 cents, which is in
fact equal to the grid’s selling price [21]. This value is based
on the rationality assumption of the EUs where each EU is
willing to charge the SFC as much as the grid for selling its
energy. The budget of the SFC is considered to be 1000 cents,
which is chosen to maintain the condition pnen ≤ C < Pnen
throughout the simulation process. Further, the choice of C is
also chosen such that the price pn for any EU n does not go
below the grid’s buying price pg,buy = 8.00 cents/kWh [21].
This is necessary to ensure that all EUs are interested in selling
to the SFC instead of to the grid. The sensitivity parameter
αn ∀n is chosen randomly from the range [1, 3]. Thus, a
consumer with αn = 1 is least sensitive to its choice of
price whereas consumers with sensitivity ≈ 3 are considered
to be strictly constrained to the price choice. Nevertheless, it
is important to note that all parameters used in this study are
particular for this example only and may vary according to the
needs of the SFC, weather conditions, time of day/year and
the energy policy of the particular country.
To that end, in Fig. 3, we first show how the proposed
game with 10 EUs converges to its CCS solution when we
adopt Algorithm 1. Firstly, according to this figure, the choice
of price of each of the participating EUs reaches its CCS
after the 8th iteration of the algorithm. Hence, the speed of
the algorithm is reasonable. Secondly, different EUs determine
different prices to pay to the SFC for energy trading, which
is mainly due to the way that the pricing scheme is designed.
Note that although the target price Pn ∀n per unit of energy is
considered similar for all EUs, the energy surpluses available
to them are different. Also, different EUs have differing
sensitivity to the pricing policy. As a consequence, once the
CCG Π reaches the CCS, the socially optimal price vector
constitutes a different price per of unit energy for each EU as
demonstrated in Fig. 3.
It is important to note that the outcome of the proposed CCG
Π is significantly affected by the size of the cake of the game,
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm to reach the CCS of the proposed CCG Π.
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Fig. 3: Demonstration of the convergence of the proposed Algorithm 1 to the
CCS of the proposed CCG Π. It is noted from the figure that the price vector
reaches its CCS after 8th iterations.
i.e., the total budget available to the SFC, and the number
of participating EUs that are sharing the cake between them
through choosing a suitable price per unit of energy. Now, to
show the effect of the number of EUs that are sharing the
budget of the SFC through the proposed CCG Π, we consider
an example where four different of EUs are sharing the SFC’s
budget in order to maximize their net benefits by choosing a
suitable price per unit of energy. The graphical representation
of this considered study is shown in Fig. 4. We change the
number of EUs from 10 to 40 with an increment of 10, and
show the average net benefits achieved by each EU of each
respective case in the figure. According to Fig. 4, first we
note that as the number of EUs increases, the average benefit
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As the total budget becomes larger, the average
benefit per EU increases.
Fig. 4: Demonstration of the effect of the total budget of the SFC and the
number of EUs that are sharing the budget on the average net benefit achieved
by each EU participating in the proposed CCG Π.
achieved by each EU decreases due to sharing the same budget
of the SFC. For instance, as the number of EUs increases
from 10 to 40, the average benefit for sharing 1000 cents by
choosing a suitable price per unit of energy decreases from
1250 to 390, which is around a 68% decrement. Essentially,
more EUs taking part in energy management enables each
EU to take a smaller share of the budget, which subsequently
reduces their benefits in energy trading with the same total
budget.
Another interesting aspect that can be noticed from the
effect of the SFC’s budget on the overall energy trading
scheme is that the same budget may not be suitable to
encourage all the EUs from EU groups of different sizes to
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TABLE II: Demonstration of the effect of SFC’s total budget on the partic-
ipation rate of EUs (with surplus energy) in energy trading. It is considered
that if any EU does not receive a minimum payment of pg,buy = 8.00
cents/kWh it does not trade its energy with the SFC. Thus, a lower budget
for a large number of EUs subsequently decreases the percentage rate of the
EUs’ participation in energy trading with the SFC. Here, the actual numbers
of EUs that participate in energy trading are shown whereby their percentages
compared to the total EUs in the network are shown within the brackets.
 
Budget (cents) 
Percentage EU participation 
Total EU =10 Total EU =20 Total EU =30 Total EU =40 
1000 10 (100%) 8 (40%) 6 (20%) 0 (0%) 
2000 10 (100%) 20 (100%) 18 (60%) 16 (40%) 
3000 10 (100%) 20 (100%) 30 (100%) 32 (80%) 
4000 10 (100%) 20 (100%) 30 (100%) 40 (100%) 
 
TABLE III: Demonstration of the effect of the sensitivity parameter of EUs
on their average net benefit. For this particular example, all 10 EUs are
considered to possess the same sensitivity parameter, i.e., all EUs have the
same sensitivity to their chosen price per unit of energy. The average net
benefit per EU is compared, i.e., percentage decrement as shown within
brackets, with the case when all EUs possess αn = 1, ∀n.
 
Sensitivity 
αn 
Average net benefit 
(Budget C = 1000 cents) 
Average net benefit 
(Budget C = 2000 cents) 
1 521.71 945.00 
1.5 486.27 (- 6.6%) 904.6 (- 4.2%) 
2.0 466.06 (-10.6%) 881.47 (- 6.7%) 
2.5 452.78 (-13.2%) 865.25 (- 8.4%) 
3.0 442.93 (-15.1%) 852.48 (-9.8%) 
 
trade their energy with the SFC. In this regard, we show the
participation rate of EUs from different sizes of EU groups in
Table II. It is assumed that if the price per unit of energy that
an EU charges the SFC for selling its energy falls below pg,buy,
which is considered to be 8.00 cents/kWh for this particular
case study, it does not participate in energy trading. This is
due to the fact that, as explained in Section II, the expected
return from selling energy for the EU becomes very small.
Now, according to Table II, for a similar budget C of the
SFC, the participation rate of EUs reduces considerably as
the number of EUs in a group increases. For instance, for a
budget of 1000 cents, 100% EU participation is observed from
a group of 10 EUs, whereby the participation rate decreases
to 40%, 20% and 0% respectively for EU group size of 20, 30
and 40. Nonetheless, by increasing the budget C, the SFC can
encourage more EUs to be involved in the energy trading with
the SFC and can reduce its total cost of energy trading. Thus,
as shown in Table II, the proposed scheme can essentially
assist the SFC in deciding on its budget with a view to increase
participation, if appropriate, with the SFC.
Remark 2. It is important to note from the above discussion in
Fig. 4 and Table II that a suitable choice of the SFC’s budget
C is critical to successful adaptation of energy management
in the community through the proposed CCG Π as this may
possibly affect the average net benefit per EU as well as the
total cost incurred by the SFC. The proposed scheme has the
potential to assist the SFC in deciding on its budget in order
to encourage more EUs, if feasible, to take part in energy
trading with the SFC.
Furthermore, the choice of price and consequently the ob-
tained net benefit by each EU is also affected by its sensitivity
parameter αn ∀n, which we show in Table III. For this case,
we assume that all EUs in the system are equally sensitive
to their chosen price per unit of energy, i.e., they have the
same αn, ∀n, whereby their available surpluses to sell to
the SFC are different as in previous examples. We consider
five sensitivity parameters including 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0,
where 1.0 refers to the case when the EUs are insensitive
to the choice of price per unit of energy and 3 indicates
maximum sensitivity of the EU. The average net benefit to
the EU at αn = 1 is considered as the baseline and is used to
compare how the average net benefit to the EUs varies as their
sensitivity is altered in the system. As can be seen in Table III,
the average net benefit to the EUs decreases as the sensitivity
increases. For a budget of 1000 cents, for instance, as the
sensitivity parameter increases from 1 to 3, the average net
benefit to the EU reduces by 15.1%. In fact, as the sensitivity
increases, the choice of price becomes more restricted for an
EU, which consequently reduces its net benefit. A reduction
in net benefit with increasing sensitivity is also observed for
a budget of 2000 cents. However, for the higher budget, we
find two modifications in terms of achieved average net benefit
per EU. Firstly, the benefit per EU increases as the budget of
the SFC increases, which is explained in Fig. 4. Secondly,
the decrement of average net benefit per EU for different
sensitivity parameters compared to αn = 1 is relatively lower
for a larger budget. For example, as the sensitivity parameter
increases from 1 to 3, the average net benefit per EU reduces
to 9.8% for a budget of 2000 cents, whereas this reduction
is 15.1% for 1000 cents. This is due to the fact that although
αn is considered the same for all EUs, the available surplus of
each EU is different, which enables discriminate pricing. Now,
based on the available surplus, each EU chooses its price per
unit of energy, which increases for a larger budget (as shown in
Fig. 4). As a consequence, the difference between net benefits
reduces at a higher budget compared to the case of a lower
budget.
Having demonstrated some properties of the proposed dis-
criminate pricing scheme, we now show how the proposed
scheme can be beneficial to both the EUs and the SFC
compared to the traditional case when both parties trade their
energy with the grid. To show this comparison, we assume
that the selling and buying prices per unit of energy set by the
grid are 44 and 8 cents per kWh as discussed earlier in this
section. To this end, we first consider in Table IV how much
energy the SFC can buy within its budget if it only buys from
the grid, compared to the case in which the SFC buys from
the users through the proposed scheme. Then, in Table V, we
show the total monetary benefit EUs can attain if they choose
to sell their surplus to the SFC instead of selling the surplus
to the grid.
In Table IV, we show the amount of energy that an SFC can
buy from EUs if the proposed scheme is adopted as the SFC
changes its budget from 1000 cents to 2000 and then 3000
cents. We note that as the SFC increases its budget, more EUs
would be interested in taking part in energy trading with the
SFC (e.g., as shown in Table II), which subsequently increases
the amount of energy that the SFC can obtain from the
participating EUs. A similar increment in purchasing energy
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TABLE IV: Demonstration of the benefit to the SFC in terms of the amount
of energy that the SFC can get from the proposed trading scheme compared
to the case when the SFC only buys its energy from the grid for the same
budget.
 
 
 Energy purchased by the SFC 
Trading scheme Budget 1000 cents Budget 2000 cents Budget 3000 cents 
Buying from the grid 22.7 kWh 45.5 kWh 68.18 kWh 
Proposed scheme 
(Buying from EUs)  
81 kWh 162 kWh 243 kWh 
Increase in 
purchasing energy 
amount for the 
proposed case (with 
same budget) 
58.3 kWh 116.54 kWh 174.82 kWh 
TABLE V: Demonstration of the benefits to the EUs in terms of total monetary
revenue that the participating EUs receive when they trade their surplus energy
with the SFC compared to trading energy with the grid.
 
Trading scheme 
Total revenue to participating EUs 
10 EUs 20 EUs 30 EUs 
Sell to the grid 648 cents 1296 cents 1944 cents 
Proposed scheme 
(Sell to the SFC) 
1000 cents 2000 cents 3000 cents 
Revenue 
improvement to 
the EUs for the 
proposed scheme 
352 cents 704 cents 1056 cents 
 
 
is also observed in the case when the SFC buys its energy
from the main grid. However, for each budget, the energy that
the SFC can buy from the EUs is considerably larger than the
amount that the SFC can buy from the grid. For instance, for a
budget of 1000 cents, the SFC can buy 58.3 kWh more energy
through the proposed scheme compared to buying exclusively
from the grid. This is due to the fact that the grid price is
generally very high [35]. Hence, for a fixed budget C, the SFC
can buy relatively smaller amounts of energy from the grid.
As a consequence, the SFC manages to buy considerably more
energy with the same budget. This phenomenon is observed
for all considered SFC’s budgets as shown in Table IV.
In Table V, we show how the participating EUs in the
proposed scheme can benefit in terms of total revenue that
they can receive from trading their surplus energy to the SFC
compared to selling to the grid. To this end, we first note that
the proposed energy scheme through CCG Π is complete as
discussed in Section III-B. Therefore, the total revenue that
the participating EUs receive, for 10, 20 and 30 EUs in the
network, becomes equal to the considered budgets of 1000,
2000, and 3000 cents respectively. By contrast, as the EUs
trade their energy with the grid the total revenue reduces
significantly because of the lower buying price per unit of
energy from the grid. For example, as 10 EUs participating in
the CCG Π, the total revenue that they receive is equal to the
1000 cents budget of the SFC. Nonetheless, as the EUs trade
their energy with the main grid, due to a lower per unit price
of 8 cents/kWh, the total revenue that the participating EUs
receive reduces to 648 cents, which is 352 cents less than the
proposed scheme for the considered system parameters. The
performance improvement for the proposed case is better for
higher numbers of EUs in the network.
Remark 3. It is clear from Table IV and Table V that the
proposed scheme is beneficial for both the SFC and the
participating EUs in the smart grid network for the system
parameters considered in the given case studies. Hence, the
proposed scheme has the potential to be adopted in practical
systems in order to benefit all participating entities.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated a viable method to discriminate
price per unit of energy between different energy users in a
smart grid system when the EUs sell their surplus energy to
a shared facility controller. A cake cutting game has been
proposed to leverage the generation of discriminate pricing
within a constrained budget of the SFC. To study the fairness
of the proposed scheme, it has been shown that the CCG can
be modeled as a variational inequality problem that possesses
the solution of the game, i.e., the cake cutting solution. The
properties of the CCS have been studied and the existence of
a socially optimal solution, which is also Pareto optimal, has
been validated. An algorithm has been proposed that can be
adopted by each EU interacting with the SFC in a distributed
manner and the convergence of the algorithm to the optimal
CCS has been confirmed. Finally, the properties of the game
have been studied, and the advantages of discriminate pricing
for both the SFC and the EUs have been demonstrated via
simple comparisons with energy trading with the main grid.
An important extension of the proposed scheme would be
to establish a relationship between the budget of the SFC
and the total number of EUs participating in the energy
trading with a view to enabling efficient price discrimination,
e.g., by using an interactive Stackelberg game with imperfect
information of the total budget. Another potential extension
is to conduct studies that determine when such a discriminate
pricing technique can be used as a real-time pricing scheme.
In addition, extending the proposed scheme to a time-varying
environment is another interesting topic for future work.
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